Discriminating language rights and politics in the post-Yugoslav states by Pupavac, Vanessa
 Discriminating Language Rights and Politics in the Post-Yugoslav States 
 
Vanessa Pupavac, School of Politics and International Relations, University of 
Nottingham NG7 2RD, vanessa.pupavac@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
Published in the journal Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2006, pp. 112-128. 
 
Abstract: Pupavac examines the rise of linguistic human rights advocacy and its 
approach in a case study of language politics in the post-Yugolav states. A core 
concern of contemporary linguistic rights advocacy has been to tackle ethnically 
based discrimination and promote ethnic diversity. It does not only seek to prevent 
states from discriminating against those who speak minority languages. It expects 
states to take positive steps to preserve their diversity of languages. However 
strategies affirming distinct linguistic identities may become complicit in perpetuating 
ethnic discrimination and ethnic divisions, as is evident in the language politics of the 
post-Yugoslav states.   
 
Linguistic human rights advocacy and its discontents 
 
There has been a remarkable expansion of international human rights advocacy over 
the last decade. This expansion has inspired a new movement for linguistic human 
rights. Not only has more attention been paid to existing language rights in existing 
international documents, but important new documents and provisions have been 
codified such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 1992 or the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages 1992. Linguistic human rights advocacy, as the titles 
of these documents indicate, has become linked to what is known as the third 
generation of rights, namely cultural or identity rights. Linguistic human rights 
advocacy seeks to prevent language loss and foster minority languages to improve 
interethnic relations and the status of minorities. However, this paper identifies certain 
problems with linguistic rights as identity rights as a means of improving interethnic 
relations and the status of minorities.  
 
The linguistic human rights literature has predominately been written from an 
advocacy perspective. Consequently the literature has tended to assume that rights‟ 
recognition must advance groups‟ rights and well-being. However, if we understand 
the development of human rights, as law in general, has had historically both 
progressive and repressive strands, then we cannot assume that the codification of 
particular rights necessarily promotes social justice and political freedoms. But in 
making precisely this assumption, most human rights literature has revolved around 
rights protection, around the codification and implementation of rights. Consequently 
much human rights literature has been rather impatient with discussing the nature of 
rights. Thus Susan Mendus speaks of how „We should begin, not with a theoretical 
anxiety about the nature and origin of rights, but rather with a political question about 
what protection rights can afford us‟.1  
 
Nevertheless a glance at the history of minority rights, to which linguistic rights have 
become linked, demonstrates abhorrent past uses under the Nazis and Apartheid, 
undermining social justice and political freedoms. As the philosopher Hannah Arendt 
reminds us, „minority treaties did not necessarily offer protection but could also serve 
as an instrument to single out certain groups for eventual expulsion‟, that is, facilitate 
their statelessness.
2
 These abhorrent uses should at least serve to make us pause and 
reflect upon the nature of the rights being advocated and whether they do advance 
justice and freedom. Of relevance to linguistic human rights thinking, there has been a 
tendency to assume that the 1990s‟ codification of international human rights expands 
people‟s rights and that the three successive generations of human rights are 
compatible with each other. However, tensions exist between language rights as 
freedom of communication and language rights as identity recognition. Language 
rights as identity recognition can exacerbate ethnic divisions rather than overcome 
them. At the same time the codification of rights as identity recognition can represent 
a diminished model of justice: bureaucratic administration of justice rather than 
substantive justice. 
 
The article will explore the problems of discriminating language rights through an 
analysis of language politics in the post-Yugoslav states. Language has been an 
important aspect of nationalist politics in the region. Indeed disputes over language 
rights prefigured the ethnic divisions of the war. Yet ironically SFR Yugoslavia had 
one of the most extensive provisions for language rights in the world. Indeed the 
country had contributed to the drafting of international linguistic rights documents 
prior to its break-up. Nevertheless language became a site of political contestation in 
which disputes were not confined to the position of Slovenian, Macedonian, Albanian, 
Hungarian or other languages versus the dominant language formerly known as 
Serbo-Croatian, but involved disputes over the codification of the latter as a single 
language. The break-up of SFR Yugoslavia has involved the break-up of Serbo-
Croatian as an official language and the designation of distinct Bosnian, Croatian, 
Montenegrin and Serbian official languages, commonly referred to as BCS among 
international interpreters, whose usage I will follow here.  
 
The successor states have signed up to key international human rights documents. The 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina has incorporated international human rights 
conventions as Bosnian law including the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages 1992 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities 1994.
3
 Its constitution also contains a non-discrimination clause, which 
includes the ground of language.
4
 Ironically, however, linguistic human rights 
discourse, despite its conscious goal of preventing discrimination, has actually helped 
legitimise ethnic divisions in the post-Yugoslav states. Importantly nationalists in the 
region have been invoking linguistic rights to assert difference, support negative 
stereotyping and demarcate ethnic minorities from mainstream society. BCS language 
politics illustrates how the designation of linguistic minority status can be experienced 
as exclusionary and being deprived of full citizenship rights. Equally the assertion of 
distinct language claims can be an obstacle to ethnic coexistence. In other words, 
more can mean less, in which minority rights can be used to deny rights and deter 
reconciliation. The case is of relevance not only to the needs of ethnic minorities and 
refugees in the new expanded Europe but to linguistic policies in other post-conflict 
areas such as Northern Ireland. 
 
I begin by outlining how the evolving linguistic human rights framework 
conceptualises linguistic rights as encompassing positive identity recognition, not 
simply negative civil freedoms. I then highlight the influence of identity politics and 
the importance of identity recognition in the contemporary understanding of justice. 
Finally I examine the definition of a language in linguistic rights advocacy and its 
application to BCS language politics.  
 
Recognising linguistic identity 
 
Language rights have been given new prominence under international law since the 
end of the Cold War. Linguistic human rights thinking has basically followed the 
prevailing patterns in the human rights sector and its interest in group, cultural or 
identity-based rights. Greater emphasis has been put on collective rights in linguistic 
human rights advocacy.
5
 Individual linguistic rights evidently mean little if one 
cannot exercise them with other people, for language is fundamentally about 
communication. However, linguistic human rights advocacy over the last two decades 
has not been concentrated on collective rights to freedom of expression and assembly, 
but has been „committed to the struggle for the promotion, preservation and 
protection of language minority communities‟6, that is, maintaining language 
diversity and securing the right to communicate in a specific language.
7
 The 
maintenance of specific languages is treated as a fundamental rather than just an 
enrichment-orientated right.
8
 Thus an advocate speaks of how, „The continued 
survival of languages must be seen as a fundamental human rights concern that cannot 
be abrogated without a compelling governmental interest‟.9  
 
Earlier international documents such as the UN Charter 1945 or the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 basically provide non-discrimination and freedom 
of expression clauses. Accordingly the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 provides that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities „shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their 
group […] to use their own language‟.10 The actions expected of states are concerned 
with individuals‟ access to general rights, rather than with protecting specific 
languages. In contrast, the evolving international human rights framework now 
requires states actively to maintain linguistic identities, not simply refrain from 
discriminating on the basis of language. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 1992, for 
example, requires states to „protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, 
religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and 
shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity‟.11 To realise this 
objective, the 1992 Declaration requires states to „take measures to create favourable 
conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics 
and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs‟.12 Likewise 
the Council of Europe‟s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992 
requires positive affirmation of linguistic identity in their public and private usage.  
 
Consider, for example, how the 1966 Covenant refers to „free assistance of an 
interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court‟13. In other 
words, individuals are entitled to an interpreter in court to help their comprehension 
and ability to represent their case, not to affirm their linguistic identity. However, the 
1992 European Charter precisely requires courts to recognise linguistic identity, as its 
Committee of Experts reiterates in its report to Croatia, which I quote at length:  
 
It should be underlined that this provision [Article 9], whereby the Parties 
undertake to guarantee the accused the right to use his/her regional or 
minority language, goes beyond the right of the accused, as laid down in 
Article 6 paragraph 3.e of the European Convention on Human Rights, to 
have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court. This measure goes further in the sense that 
speakers of a regional or minority language may use that language before 
a court of law, even if they are capable of communicating in the official 
language, thereby creating or enlarging the space for the use of these 




In short, fundamental linguistic human rights are deemed in today‟s human rights 
approach to encompass maintenance of linguistic identities. The European Charter has 
become a catalyst promoting new language provision for Europe‟s linguistic 
communities in the name of a pluralist Europe.
15
 The next section considers how 
policy-makers have made identity recognition central to concepts of justice. 
 
Justice as identity 
 
The recognition of linguistic identity in international human rights documents has 
been propelled both by the influence of identity politics and contemporary 
international conflict management policies, which have rejected earlier assimilatory 
modernisation strategies. Assimilatory modernisation strategies posited economic 
development as key to promoting social justice and international peace. Within the 
modernisation model, an inverse link was made between linguistic diversity, and 
national and social development.
16
 Policy discussions considered whether linguistic 
homogeneity was a consequence of modernisation or a prerequisite.
17
 Hence linguistic 
diversity was not regarded as part of social justice under the modernisation model, but 
even counter to social justice as a possible obstacle to development.  
 
However the negative policy view of linguistic diversity changed as modernisation 
strategies came under criticism for undermining the stability of societies and creating 
frustrated, alienated and rootless individuals.
18
 Modernisation‟s failures generated 
concern that international policy should tackle anomie and devise sustainable 
development policies which would foster stable functional communities. Official 
policy was reinforced by developments in radical politics away from Marxian-
inspired accounts which posited the proletariat as a progressive class ultimately 
seeking to extinguish itself as a class. The new identity-based politics that developed 
in the 1960s, disenchanted with both Western and Soviet modernisation models, 
instead sought empowerment of group identities as an approach to address 
discrimination and promote social justice. Against the previous assimilatory 
modernisation models, recognition of identity has become an important strategy to 
prevent the alienation of marginalised groups and secure their social inclusion.
19
 Low 
self-esteem and lack of identity recognition is regarded as being at the root of many 
social problems today.
20
 Consequently assimilationist policies are viewed negatively 
as violating people‟s identities rather than socially progressive.  
 
These concerns over securing identity are evident in linguistic human rights advocacy, 
which views linguistic identity as crucial to securing individuals‟ identity and 
psychosocial well-being. Identification with a specific language is treated as essential 
to a community‟s identity and self-esteem, which in turn is seen as crucial to securing 
a community‟s well-being and fostering harmonious relations between communities 
and preventing violent conflict. Thus linguistic human rights have become part of 
international governance. Protecting linguistic identities as part of fostering self-
esteem is given an important role to address the insecurities of people both 
domestically and globally. Linguistic human rights have, for example, been related by 
advocates „to the solution of some of Africa‟s grave social, economic and political 
problems‟.21 Since language is made core to identity, then a language‟s demise is seen 
as annihilating identity. In turn, the linguistic human rights literature conceptualises 
the death of languages as linguicide or linguistic genocide. The Genocide 
Convention‟s failure to recognise linguistic genocide is deplored.22 Necessary 
language rights in this model of justice therefore encompass specific language 
recognition. Accordingly, linguistic human rights are being advanced today as rights 





Since linguistic identification is seen as core to securing identity, there is more 
sympathy for recognising subjective linguistic identifications, that is, claims for 
language recognition based on a community declaring itself to be a distinct language 
community. Equally policies to protect the „social conditions of production‟ of 
communities have been demanded to facilitate linguistic identity maintenance.
24
 Yet 
claim-making by marginalised groups through identity rights may simply represent 
attempts to gain the rights, freedoms and social goods enjoyed by other citizens, 
especially when groups astutely anticipate that contemporary policy responses favour 
identity claims rather than general claim-making.
25
 Furthermore a linguistic model 
treating language erosion as fostering social pathology supports linguistic identity 
rights becoming an obligation over individuals. Accordingly, some identity rights 
advocates are sympathetic to limiting freedom of choice to impede linguistic 




However, at times the promotion of linguistic identities to provide self-esteem seems 
to resemble an attempted bureaucratic quick-fix to the problem of securing identity 
and a substitute for social justice in circumstances of post-modern malaise. As an 
Australian civil servant admits, speaking on the lack of social prospects for poor 
Aboriginal youth, „One of the things that will keep them going is to keep them strong 
in their own culture‟.27 Moreover, critical voices are being raised over unintended 
negative consequences of identity recognition.
28
 Concern has been raised that 
identity-based claim-making risks solidifying differences between people instead of 
overcoming social inequalities. For justice based on special pleading risks fostering 
rival victim claim-making led by group representatives whose social position within 
and outside their community relies upon their community‟s marginalised condition. 
Consequently identity-based claim-making may encourage social problems being 
conceptualised as competing identities and exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. Again 
identity rights may be invoked against communities
29
 or within communities 
reinforcing undemocratic power relations and group conformity.
30
 These criticisms 
are relevant to the experience of former Yugoslavia and the new states as I will 
highlight below. 
 
Discriminating language divisions 
 
Before I examine BCS language politics, I need first to return to the question of when 
is a language because this is fundamental to proper anti-discriminatory language 
planning and is at issue in the BCS language disputes. What is a language under 
international human rights instruments remains muddled despite its obvious 
importance. Human rights advocates, in their haste to establish a human rights 
framework, have overlooked the problem of determining when a language exists, and 
concentrated on codifying rights and monitoring procedures. The European Charter 
exceptionally provides a definition and explanatory notes. However its practice 
contradicts its own definition of a language which „does not include dialects of the 
official language of the state‟.31 
 
What criteria can be used to determine when a distinct language as opposed to a 
dialect exists? Essentially the criteria fall into two sorts: comparative linguistic 
criteria or subjective criteria involving the speakers‟ identification of themselves as 
having a distinct linguistic identity.
32
 Differences between external and internal 
definitions of a language‟s existence commonly relate to the dialect/language 
distinction. Under external linguistic categorisation, American and British English are 
varieties of the same language, as are Dutch and Flemish, although they may have 
different titles. The explanatory report to the European Charter expressly states that 
the Charter does not recognise a language on the basis of personal claims:  
 
The concept of language as used in the charter focuses primarily on the 
cultural function of language. That is why it is not defined subjectively in 
such a way as to consecrate an individual right, that is the right to speak 
"one's own language", it being left to each individual to define that 
language.
33
   
 
The explanatory report further outlines that the Charter does not recognise a language 
on the basis of ethnic minority claims: 
 
Nor is reliance placed on a politico-social or ethnic definition by 
describing a language as the vehicle of a particular social or ethnic group. 
Consequently, the charter is able to refrain from defining the concept of 
linguistic minorities, since its aim is not to stipulate the rights of ethnic 
and/or cultural minority groups, but to protect and promote regional or 




Again the explanatory report reiterates how the Charter is not designed to protect 
regional dialects: 
 
These languages must clearly differ from the other language or languages 
spoken by the remainder of the population of the state. The charter does 





Nevertheless, in recent years, both minority rights advocacy and sociolinguistics have 
become more sympathetic towards subjective identification, along with endorsing „a 
maximalist position for minorities‟.36 So subjective identifications have been given 
more weight, although linguist advocates would not necessarily support certain claims 
to language status which comparative linguistic criteria would challenge. Indeed, 
subjective language identifications have been recognised under human rights regimes, 
including the European Charter, despite its provisions to the contrary. For the 
European Charter allows subjective criteria to be used by the signatory state in 
determining whether a language exists. As the explanatory report goes on to outline, 
the Charter: 
 
does not pronounce on the often disputed question of the point at which 
different forms of expression constitute separate languages. This question 
depends not only on strictly linguistic considerations, but also on psycho-
sociological and political phenomena which may produce a different 
answer in each case. Accordingly, it will be left to the authorities 
concerned within each state, in accordance with its own democratic 





Overlooked in this position outlined by the explanatory report is how policies 
maximising identity distinctions can demarcate exclusion rather than inclusion. 
Human rights advocates expect states to recognise minority rights and that minority 
language rights help minorities resist negative stereotyping and overcome 
discrimination and marginalisation. The identity politics informing human rights 
thinking leads declarations of distinct identities to be associated positively with social 
inclusion and pluralism. Human rights regimes are not, however, sensitive to how the 
very recognition of identity rights can be discriminatory and legitimise ethnic 
divisions.   
 
Discriminating BCS language politics 
 
I now turn to BCS language politics and how language as a symbol of identity rather 
than a means of communication has triumphed in official pronouncements on the 
language.
38
 In looking at BCS language politics, it is useful to compare the language 
question in relation to American and British English because it indicates for the non-
speaker problems with existing language recognition policies and the nature of 
linguistic discrimination experienced. 
 
Subjective identification and its recognition are at the crux of the BCS language 
question, but to demonstrate this and before discussing the appropriateness of 
international responses, I need to highlight what comparative linguistic criteria lead 
most foreign linguistic experts to define a common language.
39
 As the Slavonic and 
East European Resource Center declares, it is the academic norm „to treat BCS as one 
language‟, because although the „language formerly known as Serbo-Croatian has 
split into three separate standard languages: Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian (BCS) 
[…] all of these standards continue to be based on the same basic dialect type‟.40 
 
According to comparative linguistic analysis, the modern standard language in 
Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia remains the štokavian dialect („sto‟ being the 
word for „what‟ in the standard dialect). Within the štokavian dialect there are two 
key variants identified as the Western and the Eastern variants, or the ekavian or 
ijekavian variants, because their primary distinction is based on the divergent 
development of a Slavonic vowel: „e‟ in the Eastern variant, and „je‟ or „ije‟ in the 
Western variant, for example, the word milk is „mleko‟ and „mlijeko‟ respectfully.41 
The ekavian variant is the dominant variant of Serbia, while the ijekavian variant is 
spoken in Croatia as well as southern Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro. There are also 
some other distinct features, notably lexical differences across the regions. Commonly 
cited lexical differences between the standard spoken in Croatia and Serbia include 
the word for bread (kruh/hleb), train (vlak/voz) or the months of the year, while the 
dialects spoken in Bosnia span these lexical differences in important respects, as well 
as more consciously retaining certain Turkish elements. A visible difference is in the 
use of the Latin and Cyrillic scripts, the latter was rarely used in Croatia, except in the 
Krajina region, while its use in Bosnia common before the war became confined to 
the Bosnian Serbs in the course of the war. Thus the old Bosnian textbooks would be 
printed in either script. A single textbook might contain both, the script alternating in 
the chapters. Likewise the Sarajevo-based Oslobodenje newspaper would alternate the 
script on its pages, whereas the Belgrade-based Politika used Cyrillic and the Zagreb-
based Vjesnik used Latin. Students in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia would write in 
either script, though there was a growing personal preference for using the Latin script 
in their note-taking for the sake of speed, while students in Croatia would write in the 
Latin script. Moreover the use of two scripts was previously officially celebrated as 
symbolising the language‟s inclusiveness and the country‟s internationalism in its 
embrace of both an Eastern and Western cultural heritage. In contrast today the 
existence of two scripts is invoked to demonstrate inherent differences.  
 
Such was the previous familiarity and inter-changeability of the Latin and Cyrillic 
scripts that students in Bosnia barely had a consciousness of whether a text was in 
Latin or Cyrillic in stark contrast to the political sensibilities today. I remember as an 
exchange student at Sarajevo University in the 1980s being given a collection of 
poetry in Cyrillic by a fellow student, a Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica who did not 
register that the book was in Cyrillic until I mentioned the fact. Compare this lack of 
consciousness to how being taught Cyrillic is regarded today as oppressive by non-
Serbs. Thus a recent brief report in the Bosnian Muslim teacher, quoted in a recent 
report in the Times Higher Education Supplement, a singles out inter alia how in a 
Serbian-dominated Srebrenica „Muslim children have to read and write in Cyrillic‟,42 
illustrating how Cyrillic is experienced as symbolic violence today, whereas the script 
did not necessarily register with Bosnian students in the past when the script was 
depoliticised. 
 
The regional linguistic differences have been described as minimal and not impeding 
mutual comprehension and as being less significant than between American and 
British English.
43
 Consider distinct features of American and British English such as 
gotten/got, toward/towards as well as lexical variations such as pacifier/dummy, 
diaper/nappy or pitcher/jug. However, the regional variations in these four former 
Yugoslav republics assume huge political significance because of ethnic divisions, 





The sociolinguist James Tollefson has written how, „language policy is embedded in 
the rise of the state‟.45 This linkage between language and statehood is crucial to 
understanding BCS language politics. Linguistic differences loom large today because 
the assertion of separate languages helped support political claims to separate 
statehood based on the Romantic ideal of one nation, one language.  
 
Regional variations became sharply politicised the war with each ethnic group 
encouraged to take its linguistic cue from the capital city it was orientated towards: 
that is, the Croats from Zagreb, the Serbs from Belgrade and the Bosniacs (Muslims) 
from Sarajevo. The cleavages in linguistic identity are evident in Bosnia with 
instances of people from the same village speaking the same local dialect demanding 
their distinct language rights.
46
 The present language claims may be contrasted with 
earlier nationalist movements in the region seeking a unified state, which emphasised 
a common language despite greater regional variance in the past. Interestingly 
Croatian linguists of nineteenth century led codification of a shared standard 
language, while Croatian linguists of the present day led the idea of distinct languages 
towards legitimising claims to independent statehood. Thus along with the 
constitutional codification of Croatian as a distinct language and new grammars, 
dictionaries and textbooks, Croatian newspapers began to carry new language advise 
columns informing readers on how to speak a purer Croatian. In contrast, Serbian 
official policy, politically attached to a unified state, was slower to endorse a distinct 
Serbian language and less assiduous in pursuing language difference. Bosnian Serb 
language policy was more politicised than in Serbia itself, linked to efforts to 
legitimise Republika Srpska as well as strengthen its links to Serbia. In the course of 
the war, the ekavian variant became championed as the language of Bosnian Serbs 
and Cyrillic their script, although people in Bosnia speak the ijekavian variant and had 
used both scripts. Tellingly, while Bosnian Serb public figures vainly struggled to 
comply with the decree, documents produced in public institutions often continued to 
be typed in the Latin script, because they lacked the resources to replace the old Latin 
script typewriters. Conversely, for Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs, the previous 
common language policy requiring the learning of Cyrillic became popularly 
conceptualised as violating their human rights. Meanwhile, Bosnian advisers also 
began to codify a distinct Bosnian language.  
 
Tollefson goes on to state how, „commonality of language is one of the major sources 
for the feeling of security-through-belonging that ties individuals to nation-states‟.47 
Hence declarations of linguistic independence symbolically denying the commonality 
of language with the other two ethnic groups also contribute to removing their 
„feeling of security-through-belonging‟. Typical linguistic discrimination related to 
members of ethnic minorities finding their teaching posts challenged because they 
were deemed not to speak the official language, although other colleagues with the 
same local accent did not face these problems. Likewise typical linguistic 
discrimination related to documents such as birth, marriage or death certificates, 
property title deeds or professional certificates being challenged if written in the 
wrong script or wrong variation and having to pay for official translations for the 
documents to be formally recognised. 
 
Shoring up declarations of linguistic independence, there has been readiness to 
declare the other ethnic groups as belonging to linguistic minorities. The continuing 
strong correspondence in the language spoken across the region, however, has made 
claims impossible to sustain on comparative linguistic criteria. Consequently 
subjective criteria have been embraced by those championing the idea of distinct 
Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian languages. Claims to linguistic 
independence have stressed the paramountcy of subjective criteria in determining 
language status as well as script over the spoken word.
48
 The linguistic human rights 
model endorsing difference became complicit in linguistic discrimination, rather than 
straight-forwardly protecting ethnic minorities. For example, Croatia declared 
Croatian to be the official language of the state and Serbian as one of its minority 
languages under the European Charter, although the Charter expressly states that it 
does not recognise a dialect of the official language as minority language.
49
 The 
Charter‟s mechanisms assume that minority recognition is positive for minorities and 
therefore duly demand that Croatia comply with minority language provisions under 
the Charter. However the significance of designating linguistic minority status, of 
being excluded from the standard is to be symbolically excluded from mainstream 
society.
50
 In sum, language recognition in these circumstances denies correspondence, 
denies affinity, denies communication and denies „the feeling of security-thorough-
belonging‟.51  
 
The declarations of linguistic independence are explicable in the context of war and 
state-making and can expect to relax as the new states become assured in their 
statehood. Croatian newspapers, for example, no longer devote many column inches 
to advice on the Croatian language. However, international linguistic human rights as 
identity rights could reinforce ethnic linguistic divisions. Alternatively international 
regional linguistic experts such as the Slavonic and East European Language 
Resource Center have sought to separate again the language question from questions 
of statehood, declaring in the introduction to its website how, „While recognizing the 
countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia-Montenegro as separate, 
independent states, users of the current webliography are encouraged, as is the 
Academic norm, to treat BCS as one language …‟.52 
 
Linguistic identity rights deterring coexistence 
 
If international linguists have been generally cautious about endorsing the idea of 
distinct Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian languages,
53
 international 
negotiators and human rights advocates have been more willing to do so. International 
documents sometimes refer to distinct Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian languages or 
provide three distinct translations of a particular document, thereby legitimising the 
idea of mutual incomprehensibility. The 1995 Dayton Agreement, for example, was 
translated from English into three Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian versions,
54
 while the 
1994 Washington Accords was translated into a Bosnian and Croatian version. 
Similarly the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, set up by the 
1994 Washington Accords stated, „The official languages of the Federation shall be 
the Bosniac language and the Croatian language. The official script will be the Latin 
alphabet‟.55 Subsequently the Federation‟s Constitution revised under international 
direction now states, „The official languages of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall be: Bosnian language, Croat language and Serb language. The 
official scripts shall be Latin and Cyrillic‟.56 Likewise, the relevant provision of the 
Constitution of Republika Srpska revised under international direction now reads, 
„The official languages of the Republika Srpska are: the language of the Serb people, 
the language of the Bosniak people and the language of the Croat people. The official 
scripts are Cyrillic and Latin‟.57 Symbolically the website of the Office of the High 
Representative, designated to supervise Bosnia, refers to other languages, namely 
Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian with separate links.
58
 Similarly internationally-drafted 
election documentation in Bosnia is drawn up in three versions. Again Croatia‟s 
declaration of Serbian as one of its minority languages upon ratification of the 
European Charter in 1997 raised no international opposition. This stance is in line 
with the growing endorsement of self-definitions and the advocacy of maximalist 
positions for minorities. Instead international human rights experts criticised Croatia 
for failing to provide sufficient Serbian language provision for its ethnic Serbs, and 
also failing to recognise the Bosnian language as a minority language.  
 
Equally consider briefly the language provision for refugees in host countries, which 
is all too often shambolic. Guidance notes have proliferated in this area. Take this 
statement from an Australian memo on Bosnian refugees‟ welfare. It advises:  
 
It is offensive to Bosnians to be offered information in Serbian or Croatian 
with an assumption that those languages are similar and understandable to 
Bosnians. They often refuse to take it.
59
    
 
Here distrust in an interpreter of another ethnicity is conflated with its expression as 
language difference. But it is one thing to identify that Bosnian Muslim refugees 
might understandably be distrustful of ethnically Croatian or Serbian interpreters 
because of the war and advise against their use on that ground alone and quite another 
to endorse the nationalist position on separate languages. Such misdiagnosis only 
mystifies inter-ethnic divisions. 
 
International responses promoting special language rights and provision have 
misrepresented the interests of the ethnic groups speaking a shared language and have 
been detrimental overall to interethnic relations. Consider simply how while Croatia 
has been criticised by international experts over its provision for Serbian and Bosnian, 
international officials in Bosnia have been grappling with how linguistic identity 
rights may affirm divisions and marginalise minorities. Rather late in the day, 
international officials began tacitly to acknowledge how recognising subjectively-
defined linguistic identities could hinder inter-ethnic coexistence. International 
pragmatic support for three distinct Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian languages from 
what was previously treated as single language has hindered the reintegration of 
Bosnian education since the end of hostilities, as international reports have 
subsequently highlighted.
60
 The unintended but predictable consequences can be seen 
in the 1997 Bosnian decree for segregated education, defended by the Bosnian 
Minister of Education in terms of fulfilling minority rights requirements. International 
officials were horrified at the decree, but it reflected the logic of international 
linguistic human rights as identity rights. Ironically, Bosnian school textbooks revised 
under international supervision call the language „nas jezik‟ („our language‟)61, that is, 
they anonymise the language and draw back from language rights as identity claims in 
their efforts to overcome language discrimination and reintegrate schooling. Similarly 
the issue of language has proved a difficulty in integrating higher education in Bosnia. 
In the words, of Zdravko Grebo, a law professor at Sarajevo University, language 
dialects are used as an excuse for remaining separate‟.62 A proposed Framework Law 
of Higher Education floundered in 2004 on the language question. Again interestingly 
Professor Grebo highlights how „the fact that books for courses are usually bought in 
English, French or German makes a mockery of this‟, that is, the assertion of separate 
linguistic identities is absurd when universities increasingly rely on foreign textbooks 
anyway. Effectively proponents of reform, it seems, are trying to sidestep the 
language question by promoting the use of „foreign lecturers and teaching in 
English‟.63 Ironically then we have the proposed erosion of the use of the mother 
tongue and the use of a foreign language in Bosnian higher education, that is, a 
solution which goes counter to the philosophy of linguistic human rights advocates. 
 
Finally by way of analogy, consider again the relationship between British English 
and American English. Would we consider British English and American English to 
be distinct languages? Should special language provision be provided for ethnic 
Britains in the United States? No doubt an individual would expect to be understood 
and documents in British English, such as birth or marriage certificates, to be 
accepted by US officials without being required to translate them into American 
English. However, do they require special linguistic rights such as separate public 
schooling in British English, the translation of official documents into British English, 
the right to a court interpreter to recognise the individual‟s British English linguistic 
identity? Yet international responses to language politics in the post-Yugoslav states 
have been ill-thought out and remain contradictory. International linguistic rights 
approaches have not properly considered how language rights as identity recognition 
might actually be detrimental to members of ethnic minorities and interethnic 
relations.  
 
The linguistic human rights literature takes recognition of linguistic identity as a self-
evident good and as a measure of the advancement of rights. However, the possibility 
that linguistic rights as identity rights may become complicit in ethnic discrimination 
and the denial of rights has not been addressed by the advocacy literature. 
Significantly BCS language politics and international responses illustrate how 
ratification of subjectively-defined linguistic minorities may endorse exclusionary 
politics and discriminate against ethnic minorities.  
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